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The role of operators in the process of


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Wakuluk Ilona Edyta

Faculty of Law


University of Bialystok

iwakuluk@gmail.com

The role of operators in the process of European regionalization
Introduction
Operators (transactors)1 in the EU are extremely valuable actors not only of the economic life- they contribute to national income, but also create jobs, spend some funds for research and development, create progress. European integration is based on the Single Market, and it has increased the role of these entities. Freedom which has been giving like business, services or capital, make a framework of economic activities go far beyond national borders. Of course, such a process also takes place not only due to processes of regionalization, but also of globalization, - opening the borders, elimination of successive barriers, and due to the fact that both phenomens - regionalization and globalization have grown on the grounds of one idea - economic liberalism. The effect of free choice of place of business on the one hand and given the role of operators for a given region is to increase their role in the process of European integration. One of the aspects worth examining is the growing importance of economic entities visible on the stage of co-creation of EU law. There are some questions about the role played by strong lobby of employers? Is the growing role of operators threatens the function of the state - or the EU institutions, which in the field took the power from the states?


  1. European business: the status and importance

In the EU-27 there are approximately 20.9 million businesses (not including non-financial business), of which 0.2% are large enterprises. Simultaneously, large businesses, providing about one third of employment in the economy and generate in excess of two fifths of value added (not including non-financial business).2

In 2008, the EU-27 11 192.7 billion of gross value added was generated. The business economy (industry, constructions and services) contributed 75,7% of this total. The share of business economy in the production of value added is different in each EU country in which important role in the production of value added has got agricultural sector (agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing) and administration (public administration and defense, education, health, social work, other community, social and personal services). The contribution of this sector in the production of value added is highest in Denmark, Malta, Portugal and Sweden3.

The role of the business economy as jobs in the EU can not be overestimated - non financial business economy employs 133.75 million people and generate 5 705 billion EUR of value added.4

Part of the companies work in the regional, national arena. Some of them operate on international markets, having access to resources that exceed the budgets of small and medium-sized EU Member States.5 Turnover of the largest international companies are comparable to the size of the national income of some countries: for example, General Motors (178.2 billion USD turnover) is in terms of economic power comparable with Sweden (184.3 billion U.S. dollars of GDP), Ford (153.6 billion U.S. dollars) can be compared with Austria (GDP 157.9 billion), Shell (128.2 billion U.S. dollars) with Portugal (GDP U.S. $ 122.1 billion) and Mitsui (126.4 billion U.S. dollars) with Greece. J. E. Garten Yale argues that the multiplicity and the power balance between the market and the state, also between public authority and private power is faltered.6

The role of big companies is not limited to creating jobs and generating value added. They perform many functions previously reserved exclusively for the state. International corporations bear more than half of expenditure on research and development, ensure the provision of medical, educational and social insurance for their employees.7 On the basis of considerations relating to the taking over of responsibility for meeting social needs by the company from a government that is unwilling or unable to meet these needs, there is the concept of corporate citizenship. It grew up on the basis of discussion devoted to corporate social responsibility, as a widely understood concept also includes the activities of enterprises in the area previously served by the state.8

The mainstream debate on the role of the European integration process operators in the area of ​​business is considered vital. What's more, there are also voices that their activities can be regarded as the locomotive of integration - as the main mechanism of integration9.

While the dominant approach of regionalization as a constructive process, created by the governments and groups, are also occupied a position in which the integration is defined as the bottom-up process, performed by the entities participating in the economic process. Integration in this case occurs not as a consequence of the actions of Member States, but the activities of entrepreneurs, participants in the Single European Market.10 The implementation of many programs or initiatives would be compromised if not for the inclusion of European companies but also American.11


  1. Competition for business

Important meaning of operators combined with the possibility of full freedom of choice of the allocation of these activities poses the threat of loss of revenue for the state budget in the form of taxes. This may hinder the fulfillment of the role of the state provision of essential social needs. So it is a need to compete for the remaining companies in the market as well as acquiring new ones.

Relocation12 is a phenomenon caused not only on regional integration processes, but the broader – globalization, and is not a new phenomenon. However, it becomes appropriate to review the risks of relocation in terms of European integration, which for example can it come alive. Entry to the EU-10 countries on 1 May 2004 and 2 countries from 1 January 2007 significantly expanded the geographical scope of business opportunities in the territory of countries which such offer lower tax rates. On the basis of considerations relating to the relocation process in the EU there are threads of social dumping or the needs for tax harmonization in the EU.

Relocation can occur not only between Member States of the regional group but also between the grouping and the rest of the world. In this situation, there is a pulse on regional level to create incentives which may be reflected in the legislation of the grouping. Incentives may also include an influx of new investors, it is the inflow of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment).

In 2009 to the European Union were sent 361 949 million dollars foreign direct investment, the crisis has caused a significant decrease in comparison to previous years, when the value of foreign direct investment was, respectively, in 2008 - 536 917 and 2007 - 923 810 million dollars. The EU competes for foreign investment inflows to other economies, both developed and developing countries. Economies of developed countries in 2009 attracted 383,349 million U.S. dollars of foreign investment, while the economies of developing countries by almost half million dollars more -548,297 U.S. dollars. United States in 2009 saw the influx of foreign investments amounting to 129,883 million dollars, and countries such as China and India respectively 95,000 and 34,613 million dollars.13

According to World Investment Prospect Survey, EU remain among the top tree direct investment host regions. However, the forecast is increased interest in developing and transition economies, especially in South, East and South-East Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. In comparison the most attractive destinations of foreign investment inflows in the top five economies were four countries that do not belong to a highly developed: China, India, Brazil and Russian Federation.14

Being the recipient of a substantial part of FDI, while experiencing increasing competition from developing countries in attracting foreign investment, the EU has a motive for creating the new incentives and solutions that promote FDI inflows.

Attracting businesses is reasonable - increases the chance of economic development and modernization. At the same time forcing it to market deregulation, and limited ability to shape an economic policy, employment and social policy.15

Countries that are unable to provide adequate infrastructure, they do not have adequate resources relevant to the contemporary international economic activity are circumvented by transnational corporations and international capital flows and knowledge. An example of such a process is almost the entire African continent.16



3. Effect of operators on the development of policies and laws in the European Union

The important role of operators implies the impact on the integration process - from law-making process - they are due to their weight entities, which is right, directly or indirectly can co-shape. Their negotiating position is determined, inter alia, market share, or disposal of a key technology.17

Is reasonable to draw attention to the design of decision-making in the EU in terms of the impact of economic entities that play in this process.

With a significant impact on the socio – economic situation operators in the EU have a significant role in the lawmaking process - such as its originators (not mentioned at this point of the legislative initiative, which with some exceptions, has been granted an exclusive to European Commission) or its recipients. Entrepreneurs of the EU, affected by their activities on the process of European integration in the legal dimension and by supporting the implementation of the EU legal order. This happens because of an enforcement action before the national courts and the judicial system of the European Union.18

Decision making system in the EU does not provide for direct involvement of operators in the process. The activities of the legislative authority EU: EU Council and European Parliament does not provide visibility of the We can only emphasize the universality of the elections to the European Parliament, members of which are representatives of all the structures of EU citizens, including operators. Activities of
operators in the EU can be seen, but in the institutions and their opinions - here will play a leading role the European Economic and Social Committee. Not having a direct legislative initiative, nor acting as the legislative function, effectively affects the shape of the legislative process in the EU: European Commission acts on 81% of EESC opinions. The structure of the Commission clearly provides the role of the Employers, who are concentrated in the first of three groups of the body. Group I focused members representing the private and public sectors of industry, SMEs, chambers of commerce, transport and financial services.19

Interaction of society (natural and legal persons) in the European Union institutions can take three forms:



  • through representation in the European Parliament, whose members come from universal suffrage in free and secret ballot, so they are representatives of EU citizens;

  • through consultation in the institutional form, expression of which is the activity of the advisory bodies of the EU - European Economic and Social Comittee and Comittee of the Regions, in accordance with their duties competences defined in the Treaties;

  • through less formal direct contacts with stakeholders.20

The European Commission has a long tradition of consulting interested parties in formulating policies. The consultation mechanism is part of the EU institutions at every stage of decision-making process - from shaping a legislative proposal by the European Commission after the final adoption of the act and its implementation. However, the existence of institutionalized advisory bodies - Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions, shall not preclude the need for direct contacts between the EC and stakeholders. Moreover, extensive consultations with the European Commission's duty to have their source in the EU primary law provided for in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Thus it is assumed that there is no contradiction between the wide consultation and the concept of representative democracy. At the same time, should be emphasized that the decision-making in the European Union is legitimized by the elected representatives of the European peoples. Thus, the active participation of stakeholders in the process of EU law can receive a voice but not a vote.21

Despite emerging concerns and discussions on the consultation and collaboration with stakeholders in formulating policies, traditions of lobbying in the EU develops along with the development of European integration.



  1. Lobbying in the European Union - the representation of business

European integration, for the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union was essentially economic orientation. The construction of a customs union, the entry into force of the Single European Act and the establishment of economic freedoms of the single European market and a process of creating economic- monetary union is milestones around which the story focuses on economic integration in the EU. It has become a largely market regulator. Taking over the competence of Member States in many areas of business has become the recipient of lobbying activities. The very fact implies a stronger position marketization companies22; from the fact that the transfer of competences from the Member States on the level of EU institutions, it appears that the latter became the recipient in the course of the integration activities of interest.23 Interest groups have developed so the "European strategy", which is expressed by the fact that almost 70% of German, British and French trade associations to maintain contacts with institutions, both domestic and European.24

Lobbying the European action can be understood as interest groups to influence decisions not yet taken the adjective European states that these activities relate to the European Union.25 The European Commission defines lobbying as "all activities aimed at influencing the processes of policy formulation and decision-making by the European institutions ".26

Among the most popular theories explaining the phenomenon of lobbying at European Union level, the model should be mentioned Broscheida A. and D. Coen (informational model of lobbying), the model Bouvena P., and the model Crombeza Ch.. Extremely interesting are the explanations P. Bouvena, which explains the existence of lobbying the EU on the basis of presence in decision-making in the EU dependence of public and private actors. They need each other's resources - information. This information may take the form of knowledge of the general European interest, national interest or the interest of the sector. Crombez explains that interest groups exert influence on decisions in the EU legislative process by providing policy makers with information on the effects of decisions, policies.27 Lack of perfect information, which is the right institution is the justification for the existence of lobbying information. Pressure groups providing expertise may therefore provide an important and necessary link in the lawmaking process.

Risks arising from the operation of pressure groups and their role in EU law-making process is their monopolization. If the pressure groups present position of knowledge and a limited group of actors (eg, geographically limited)28 to the decisions taken by working with them may consider only a limited interest of stakeholders are represented and not the entire environment from which they originate. The remedy would appear to be a pluralistic system of lobbying.

The problem of representativeness in the activities of pressure groups as early as 2002 saw the European Commission. On the one hand, there is a need to pressure groups represent a broad, balanced range of views of the environment. On the other hand, the representativeness of the organizations lobbying can not be the sole condition on which subjects to cooperate with them, for, national and regional viewpoints can be equally important - due to the fact that diversity in the EU Member States. Moreover, minority views can make an important contribution to the shaping of the post, and can not be ignored.29

The EU operates a very wide range of organizations, groups and associations focused on lobbying firms, associations, ministries of member states or state agencies. Action is no stranger to lobbying the EU institutions, which use this mechanism in its relations with other EU institutions.30 The size, diversity of activities and locations make it difficult assessment of the number of groups actively working in the area of ​​the lobbying business in the EU. It is estimated that among the pressure groups in the EU is dominated by organizations representing the business world, which according to some authors represent 66% of pressure groups31 and according to others, their participation is as high as 80%.32 In order to highlight the role of operators in lobbying the EU is founded to provide a select few - including the oldest and most successful - lobbying groups in the field of lobbying.

There are cross-sectoral and sectoral organizations representing business interests. In the group of organizations across sectors, these include the oldest to be BusinessEurope formerly as UNICE (Union des Confederation de l'Industrie et des Employeurs d `Europe) established in 1958.33 Among the achievements of UNICE include the impact on agriculture issues, a compromise solution through negotiations the membership of Spain and Portugal as well as similar trade-offs during the accession negotiations 10 countries acceding on 1 May 2004.34 For the major lobbying organization representing the interests of EU businesses should ERT-European Round Table of Industrialist, founded in 1983. His work is estimated to be extremely effective: among others in the area of introducing a common market or economic and monetary union.35 ERT was founded by 45 heads of European companies has played an important role in the economic policy of the European Economic Community and in the preparation of the Treaty on European Union.36 Companies in the ERT realizing sales in excess of € 1.000 billion, approximately 6.6 million hold jobs in the Europe.37

In the EU there are also numerous business organizations representing sectoral interests such as automotive, food and agriculture. The largest and most influential include the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC - Conseil Europeen des Federations del`Industries Chimique) and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA - European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries Associations).38

The tendency in the development of European business groups, the representation is to create a platform linking diverse stakeholders to achieve a common goal, such as the ENE G8 gathering eight companies (large industrial energy consumers such as Mercedes-Benz and Thyssen), whose common goal was to speed up liberalization in the European energy market. An example of an active platform for the food sector is the European Food Information Council, which brings together such Coca-Cola, Masterfoods, Danone and Kraft.39

It is estimated that 18% of the organizations lobbying in Brussels are the individual representatives in Brussels on private, national and international companies such as Siemens, Philips, IBM,. The most widely represented American companies.40

A model of the way of lobbying the European Commission gives data from an open register of interest groups, which, however, is voluntary, and therefore must not contain a complete list of those lobbying the European Commission.41 Of the 3,98942 companies registered, 507 are individual companies. Individual representations are both EU firms as well as from outside the EU, including U.S. firms represented: British Airways, British American Tobacco, Carrefour, Deutsche Post DHL, GlaxoSmithKlein, Unilever, Bank of America, Yahoo!43. Among 45 Polish companies are for example: Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A., Związek Banków Polskich, Polskie Koleje Państwowe S.A.

It is understood that it is the European business associations have the greatest impact on the European Commission.44

Corporations have an impact through its activities not only in
Brussels but by affecting the national structures. A good example is the negative attitude of Great Britain in the EU social policy, which comes from the pressure of British companies interested in reducing the cost of production.45

A new instrument for the expression of opinions and positions in the creation and implementation of EU law is the European Business Test Panel (EBTP) operating at the European Commission's DG Internal Market and Services. Currently, he focuses 3,619 members - to EBTP can join any company irrespective of size and sector of activity, provided that is established within the European Union (or Norway or Iceland). By participating in consultations under EBTP, business can contribute to improving the quality of legislation and support the improvement of business environment. There is an opportunity to comment on both the design stage act and share their observations on the consequences of ongoing activities of the EU. While the big improvement is the ability to express their views in one of the official languages ​​of the EU, the effectiveness of this type of soft instruments is difficult to determine (European Commission is not obliged to respond positively to the demands and opinions.).46



  1. The role of operators and the role of the state and institutions in the process of European integration

Important operators in the process of European integration raises the question of whether their growing role at the expense of the role of the state or institution of the grouping. First, it becomes reasonable to define which is the natural role of the state / institution group in the European integration process.

One of the many consequences of European integration is the erosion of the classical nation-state.47 Membership in the EU Member States' sovereignty is limited. However, understanding sovereignty in terms of ability to overcome the special interests for the general interest and noting the threat to sovereignty, such as non-transparent decision-making procedures, is staying out of the integration processes could further restrict the sovereignty.48

On the basis of economic policy, state sovereignty is not practicable, the proof of which is the functioning of supranational structures and voluntary integration groupings49, for which the state then delegate the powers or not participating in the decision making process.50 It is worth noting that "the delegation of sovereignty" will be held for the benefit of citizens, consumers, since economic decisions are left to market forces more effectively than the government.51

In terms of the role of the state / institutions in the process of European integration may prove extremely important to consider Walters and Haahr, who offer interesting reflections on the role of state / government of the European institutions in Europe (they do so on the basis of considerations concerning the influence of liberal ideas and ordoliberal in the shape of the economic governance of Europe). Also significant is the title of one of the subsections of the monograph "Governance Europe for freedom", which is suggestive background analysis of the role of the European state / institutions in the liberal history of European integration. The role of the state - in the spirit of economic liberalism Smith and Ricardo, setting up a self-regulatory function of the market - was to be minimized and to rely mainly on the protection given to freedom. According ordoliberałów concept of the common market, it is not a natural concept and requires constant attention ruling - requires creating an institutional structure. Therefore impossible to separate politics from economics of law. The vision of the common market contains elements that constitute the role of the state in social and economic life. The single market, "must promise of liberalization" in an attempt to strike a fair balance between the liberalized economy and the social economy, he established a necessary and positive role of the State / the European institutions.52

It follows that the process of European integration, having anchored in the idea of ​​economic liberalism, but the intervention of the institution he founded, and has not left her self-market mechanisms.

Reflections on the degree of economic sovereignty take place on the plane, the two opposing poles are autarky and globalization. Between these extremes there are intermediate solutions - integration processes, which is an example of the EU. With the development direction: autarky-regionalization, globalization is a reduction of state sovereignty. 53 The difference in depleting the country's sovereignty as a result of globalization and regionalization is their source - in the case of globalization is the unintended consequence, in the case of regional integration - is the result of a conscious decision by the states.54 In the process of declining state sovereignty changing its their closed economies in the global economy, the question arises: Is integration understood as a step in the process of globalization, the effect of reducing the role of the state or as a response to globalization, it protects?

Assuming that the processes of regionalization are complementary to the phenomena of globalization, or treating as a form of globalization, the integration of activities under the - limited geographically and politically - of the region and group of countries can be expected as a consequence of targeted, limited only by the scale. On the basis of relevant considerations, is therefore to approximate the same effect of globalization on the role of the state, institutions and economic entities in this dimension.

In an era of globalization, the state loses much of its traditional role. Changes its role in shaping foreign economic relations and thus reduces its impact on the adjustment of gross domestic product. Many decisions are in fact at the level of supranational organizations and transnational businesses. Field activities for their economic policy tightens up, especially when it comes to ensuring macroeconomic stability, low inflation, controlled the budget deficit, balance of payments and policy interest.55

To paraphrase the title of the work his father's liberalism, Adam Smith, the effect of global economic activity is "wealth without nations".56 The liberalization of the limits of state power since independence, reduces the state and decreases its ability to gather resources and policy implementation.57

The diminishing role of governments in the global economy L. Thurow observes: "National governments are losing power. They had it when there was a state-wide economy. And because the state economy loses its significance for the global, governments lose power. The role of capital market is larger than any state. If the market "finds" that the economic policy of Thailand is the point of view, inadequate capital market, Thailand will lead to bankruptcy". P. Kennedy similarly notes that "the autonomy and functions of the state are eroded under the influence of transnational trends".58

On the other hand, the processes of regional integration may be a response to globalization: the regionalization creates the conditions for meeting the challenges of globalization. Globalization, which in conjunction with the flows of capital and the loss of taxes makes it difficult to fill the role of state provision of basic social needs are pitted against regionalization, which responds to this threat - including, in addition to economic goals - including the social aspects of development.59

Resulting either from the phenomena of globalization and regionalization growing position of the companies raises some concerns and risks. The growing concentration of power of transnational corporations, their significance and impact on the risk created by the new law, in which the mechanism of free markets and healthy competition loses its meaning. In practice, more often not free competition and monopoly of transnational corporations impose a solution. More and more reason, therefore, are those who recognize that transnational corporations really do not subordinate themselves only by the state, but also the market. Globalization not only starts the process of undermining the state but also defines a more general process of alienating and alienated from the economic phenomena of man's power.60

This threat has been observed in the concepts ordoliberal. If provoked fear among liberals concentration of political power, ordoliberals perceive the risk of power by monopolies and cartels. While "market liberalism mobilize against the state", it ordoliberalizm notes that could lead to substitution of a state monopoly – by the private sector.61

What's more, large corporations (with monopoly power) are able to convince the government and the public that "what is good for General Motors is good for the United States". Even if a solution can only use the corporations are able to convince that this is also a benefit to society, and the arguments put forward, such as strategic importance (eg food production) and protection of national traditions.62



Soothing may however be considering the father of liberalism, mainstream being tackled at the root of economic integration in Europe. Adam Smith, wrote this: "Every man is constantly making efforts to find the most advantageous use for capital, which can dispose of. Is of course the view of his own benefit and not benefit the public. But the search for his own benefit leads him naturally, and even inevitable, to ensure that he chose such an application, what is most beneficial for society". It follows that we should not hinder economic entities which, although focused on their own profit, are such solutions that benefit the public.63
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1 The concept of economic operators for the purpose of this study is considered synonymous with the concept of enterprise, wherein the authors adopt an economic perspective the phenomenon of perception. The concept of entrepreneur in the legal sciences is understood differently, what is more, there is no specified both in the TEU and TFEU unambiguous definition. As a company in economic terms, adopted an economic operator by producing products and / or services, driven desire to obtain financial gain, the risk of this activity falls on the owner; for: M. Stoczkiewicz, Pomoc państwa dla przedsiębiorstw energetycznych w prawie Unii Europejskiej, LEX a Wolters Kluwer business, Warszawa 2011, s. 47.

2 Key figures on European business with a special feature on the recession, Eurostat, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, s. 56 - 58.

3 Key figures on European business with a special feature on the recession, op.cit., s. 30 – 31.

4 Key figures on European business with a special feature on the recession, op.cit., s. 32 – 34.

5 M. Stańczyk – Minkiewicz, Europa – razem czy osobno? Przegląd Zachodni 2010 nr 1, s. 4.

6 A. Szumski, Globalizacja w życiu gospodarczym. Aspekt moralny. Praca doktorska, Papieski Wydział Teologiczny we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2007, s. 144.

7 J. Nakonieczna, Korporacje transnarodowe a kwestia społecznej odpowiedzialności biznesu – dobry obywatel czy cyniczny wyzyskiwacz, w: Polska-Europa-Świat. Korporacje transnarodowe. Pod red. T. Guz, K.A. Kłosiński, P. Marzec, Lublin –Tomasz Lubelski 2007, s. 82, za: W. Anioł, Paradoksy globalizacji, Aspra-JR, 2002, s. 63.

8 J. Nakonieczna, Korporacje transnarodowe a kwestia społecznej odpowiedzialności biznesu – dobry obywatel czy cyniczny wyzyskiwacz, op.cit., s. 90-91.

9 B. Woszczyk, Zjawisko lobbingu w Unii Europejskiej, Dom Wydawniczy Duet, Toruń 2004, s. 63.

10 Europa przedsiębiorców. Pod red. Z. Brodecki, LexisNexis, Warszawa 2011, s. 33.

11 U. Kurczewska, Rola europejskich grup interesów ekonomicznych w kształtowaniu polityk sektorowych UE, w: Deficyt demokracji w Unii Europejskiej a europejskie grupy interesów. Pod red. U. Kurczewskiej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2008, s. 152.

12 Relocation is defined by the European Commission as the process of transferring economic activity abroad, reflecting changes in the functioning of enterprises resulting from their adaptation to an increasingly competitive environment they operate, and faster technological change: European Commission (2005), Delocalisation: Which challenges for the EU economy?, ECFIN(REP)50760/05, Brussels, za: Delokalizacja w rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej. Perspektywa wybranych państw UE. Wnioski dla Polski, Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, Departament Analiz i Strategii, Warszawa 2006, s.11.

13 World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, United Nations, UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 2010, s. 167- 171.

14 World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, op.cit., s. 24 – 25.

15 A. Dylus, Suwerenność gospodarcza – między autarkią a globalizacją, w: Suwerenność i integracja europejska. Materiały konferencyjne. Pod. Red. Wł. Czapliński, I. Lipowicz, T. Skoczny, M. Wyrzykowski, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1999, s. 258.

16 A. Szumski, Globalizacja w życiu gospodarczym. Aspekt moralny, op. cit., s.109.

17 Z. Puślecki, Unia Europejska i globalizacja – wzajemne zależności i zmiany, w: , w: Regionalizacja i globalizacja w gospodarce światowej, Tom 2, (red.) J. Rymarczyk, Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej im. Oskara Langego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2003, s. 285.

18 Europa przedsiębiorców. Pod red. Z. Brodecki, LexisNexis, Warszawa 2011, s. 33.

19 EKES - pomost między Europą a zorganizowanym społeczeństwem obywatelskim, Europejski Komitet Ekonomiczno – Społeczny, Urząd Publikacji UE, 2008, s. 14.

20 Communication from the Commission, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, Brussels, 11.12.2002, COM(2002) 704 final, s. 3.

21 Communication from the Commission, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, Brussels, 11.12.2002, COM(2002) 704 final, s. 3 - 5.

22 K. Tarnawska, Znaczenie ponadnarodowych grup nacisku w kształtowaniu polityki ekonomicznej Unii Europejskiej, Monografie: Prace Doktorskie nr 9, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, Kraków 2010, s. 24.

23 Currently it is estimated that over 70% of the national legislation has its origins in European law, but even to anticipate such a scenario recently met with disbelief. Jacques Delors, at the beginning of his presidency caused a considerable scandal, forecasting that by the year 2000 75% of Member States will come from EU law. Reality has shown that he was right. This change demonstrates the great importance of Brussels, which since the creation of the Single Market has become a major center of power in Europe; za: D. Guéguen, Lobbing Europejski, KSAP, Warszawa 2011, s. 96.

24 K. Tarnawska, Znaczenie ponadnarodowych grup nacisku w kształtowaniu polityki ekonomicznej Unii Europejskiej, op.cit., s. 25.

25 M. Sapała Gazda, Lobbing europejski a reprezentacje interesów z nowych państw członkowskich, w: Nowe państwa członkowskie Unii Europejskiej. Gospodarka, regiony, lobbing. Doświadczenia pierwszych lat członkostwa. Pod red. E. Małuszyńska, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu, Poznań 2009, s. 241, za: E. Małuszyńska, Regulacje i zasady działania grup interesów w Unii Europejskiej, w: Unia Europejska- Polska. Polityka, regulacje i sposoby działania, red. E. Małuszyńska, Zeszyt Naukowy nr 16, Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej w Poznaniu, Poznań 2002, s. 11.

26 Zielona Księga. Europejska Inicjatywa na rzecz przejrzystości, Bruksela 3.5.2006, COM(2006) 194 wersja ostateczna, s. 5.

27 K. Tarnawska, Znaczenie ponadnarodowych grup nacisku w kształtowaniu polityki ekonomicznej Unii Europejskiej, op.cit., s. 28-30.

28 For example, restrictions on lobbying activities encountered by the Member States (entities from these countries), which recently acceded to the EU - 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007. The limitations in the conduct of lobbying in the EU for these countries / entities writes: M. Sapała Gazda, Lobbing europejski a reprezentacje interesów z nowych państw członkowskich, op.cit., s. 241 - 269.

29 Communication from the Commission, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, Brussels, 11.12.2002, COM(2002) 704 final, s. 12.

30 B. Woszczyk, Zjawisko lobbingu w Unii Europejskiej, Dom Wydawniczy Duet, Toruń 2004, s. 58-59.

31 K. Tarnawska, Znaczenie ponadnarodowych grup nacisku w kształtowaniu polityki ekonomicznej Unii Europejskiej, op. cit., s. 27.

32 U. Kurczewska, Rola europejskich grup interesów ekonomicznych w kształtowaniu polityk sektorowych UE, w: Deficyt demokracji w Unii Europejskiej a europejskie grupy interesów. Pod red. U. Kurczewskiej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2008, s. 148.

33 Among the 40 members from 34 countries, is also the voice of Polish membership in the form Polish Confederation of Private Employers – Lewiatan; za http://www.businesseurope.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=600, dostęp dnia 1 czerwiec 201.

34 J. Kukułka, Lobbing międzynarodowy w Unii Europejskiej, Zeszyty Naukowe, Tom VII, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, Kutno 2005, s. 65.

35 B. Woszczyk, Zjawisko lobbingu w Unii Europejskiej, Dom Wydawniczy Duet, Toruń 2004, s. 70.

36 J. Kukułka, Lobbing międzynarodowy w Unii Europejskiej, op. cit., s. 65.

37 http://www.ert.eu/home.aspx, dostęp dnia 1 czerwiec 2011.

38 U. Kurczewska, Rola europejskich grup interesów ekonomicznych w kształtowaniu polityk sektorowych UE, op.cit., s. 148.

39 U. Kurczewska, Rola europejskich grup interesów ekonomicznych w kształtowaniu polityk sektorowych UE, op. cit., s. 149-151.

40 U. Kurczewska, Rola europejskich grup interesów ekonomicznych w kształtowaniu polityk sektorowych UE, op. cit., s. 151.

41 While registration is optional, but there are effective incentives to entities engaged in the lobbying. According to the European Commission's position: "When the consultations are needed in the context of advisory groups or consultative committees, DGs have the opportunity to introduce objective criteria including a minimum level of transparency in relation to society" for the following: Komunikat Komisji, Europejska inicjatywa na rzecz przejrzystości: rejestr grup interesu - rok później, Bruksela, dnia 28.10.2009, KOM(2009) 612 wersja ostateczna, s. 4.

42 Stan na dzień 1 czerwiec 2011: za: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do;REGRINSID=q9ftNlrGTf3hv0h3Z93ZpGn0L6y7MvxX12VYh7BTRp6H3jBBvrhS!-652572513

43 Estimated costs of lobbying activities conducted by entities in the EU institutions in 2010 ranged mostly between 100 -800 000; example: Yahoo! planned budget of 150 000EUR, Carefour 500 000 EUR and GlaxoSmithKlein - 800 000 EUR; for: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do;REGRINSID=q9ftNlrGTf3hv0h3Z93ZpGn0L6y7MvxX12VYh7BTRp6H3jBBvrhS!-652572513

44 J. Kukułka, Lobbing międzynarodowy w Unii Europejskiej, op. cit., s. 76.

45 U. Kurczewska, Rola europejskich grup interesów ekonomicznych w kształtowaniu polityk sektorowych UE, op. cit., s. 152.

46 http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/faqs/index_pl.htm; dostęp dnia 1 czerwiec 2011

47 M. Stańczyk – Minkiewicz, Europa – razem czy osobno? Przegląd Zachodni 2010 nr 1, s. 3.

48 A. Dylus, Suwerenność gospodarcza – między autarkią a globalizacją, op. cit., s. 260 – 261.

49 According to data from the World Trade Organization, according to the state on July 30, 2010, 283 functioned regional integration groupings - the majority as a free trade agreement. All WTO members - except the exception of Mongolia - in 2005 were also a party to the RTA, for: WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, dostęp dnia 20.04.2011.

50 A. Olechowski, Suwerenność w polityce gospodarczej, w: Suwerenność i integracja europejska. Materiały konferencyjne. Pod. Red. Wł. Czapliński, I. Lipowicz, T. Skoczny, M. Wyrzykowski, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1999, s. 247 - 248.

51 A. Olechowski, Suwerenność w polityce gospodarczej, op. cit., s. 248.

52 W. Walters, J. H. Haahr, Rządzenie Europą. Dyskurs, urządzanie i integracja europejska. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2011, s. 80-96.

53 A. Dylus, Suwerenność gospodarcza – między autarkią a globalizacją, op. cit., s. 255-256.

54 A. Dylus, Suwerenność gospodarcza – między autarkią a globalizacją, op. cit., s. 260.

55 A. Szumski, Globalizacja w życiu gospodarczym. Aspekt moralny, op. cit., s. 126.

56 A. Dylus, Suwerenność gospodarcza – między autarkią a globalizacją, op. cit., s. 257.

57 A. Olechowski, Suwerenność w polityce gospodarczej, op. cit., s. 254.

58 A. Szumski, Globalizacja w życiu gospodarczym. Aspekt moralny, op. cit., s. 169 - 178.

59 B. Liberska, Globalizacja gospodarki światowej i nowy regionalizm, Ekonomista nr 6/2001, s. 732- 733.

60 A. Szumski, Globalizacja w życiu gospodarczym. Aspekt moralny, op. cit., s. 173.

61 W. Walters, J. H. Haahr, Rządzenie Europą. Dyskurs, urządzanie i integracja europejska. Wydawnictwo naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2011, s. 80-96.

62 A. Olechowski, Suwerenność w polityce gospodarczej, op. cit., s. 248.

63 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations


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